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I. INTRODUCTION
In Vaden v. Discover Bank, the Supreme Court clarified when federal
courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain petitions to compel
arbitration brought under § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 Through
a § 4 petition, parties to an arbitration agreement can request a federal district
court to enforce an agreement to arbitrate if they establish federal
jurisdiction.3 Specifically, § 4 of the FAA provides, in relevant part, that
parties "may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28 .... of the subject matter
of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties .... ."4 The Court
granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split as to whether the federal character
of the issue the parties seek to arbitrate can supply subject-matter jurisdiction
over a § 4 petition. 5
The Court considered two questions: First, whether a district court, "if
asked to compel arbitration pursuant to § 4, [should] 'look through' the
petition and grant the requested relief if the court would have federal-
question jurisdiction over the underlying controversy," and second, if the
Court should adopt the "look through" test, whether a district court may
"exercise jurisdiction over a § 4 petition when the petitioner's complaint rests
on state law but an actual or potential counterclaim rests on federal law.' 6
Although the Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's "look through"
approach, it reversed and remanded, holding that Vaden's completely
preempted state-law counterclaim could not serve as the basis for the district
court's jurisdiction over Discover's § 4 petition.7 The decision emphasized
that Discover may petition a state court to enforce the arbitration agreement
pursuant to § 2 of the FAA and state statutes similar to § 4. 8
1 Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2008).
2 Id. at 1268. Although a federal statute, the FAA does not provide an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction. Id.
3 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
4Id.
5 Vaden,129 S. Ct. at 1270.
6 Id. at 1268.
7Id.
8 Id. at 1269.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case began as a simple breach of contract claim. In July 2005,
Discover Bank and Discover Financial Services, Inc. ("Discover") sued
Discover Card holder Betty Vaden in Maryland state court to recover an
unpaid balance of $10,610.74 plus interest and litigation expenses. 9 In
response, Vaden filed several class-action counterclaims alleging that the
finance charges, interest, and late fees charged by Discover violated
Maryland's credit laws.10
Instead of responding to Vaden's counterclaims in state court, Discover
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
under § 4 of the FAA seeking to compel arbitration of Vaden's
counterclaims.11 Discover alleged that pursuant to a 1999 amendment to
Vaden's cardholder agreement, Vaden had agreed to arbitrate, at the request
of either party, "any past, present, or future claim or dispute .... between
you and us arising from or relating to your Account .... ,,12 Discover further
asserted that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain Discover's § 4
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Vaden's state-law counterclaims
were completely preempted by § 27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
("FDIA"). 13 The district court granted Discover's petition and ordered the
parties to participate in arbitration. 14
Vaden appealed the decision of the district court, arguing, in relevant
part, that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the
petition.15 In Vaden I, the Fourth Circuit held that "when a party comes to
federal court seeking to compel arbitration, the presence of a federal question
in the underlying dispute is sufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction"
9 Id. at 1268.
10 Id.
I1 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1269.
12 Joint Appendix at 34-35, Vaden v. Discover Bank, 128 S. Ct. 1651 (2008) (No.
07-773), 2008 WL 2309296.
13 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1269. Section 27(a) of the FDIA provides in part:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository
institutions... with respect to interest rates.. . such State bank[s] ... may,
notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the
purposes of this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount
made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate
allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located.
12 U.S.C. § 183 ld(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
14 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1269.
15 Id.
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and remanded to determine whether a federal question existed.16 On remand,
the district court again granted Discover's petition, finding that Vaden's state
court counterclaims were completely preempted and that a federal question
existed.17
Vaden again appealed, arguing, in part, that the district court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. 18 In Vaden II, a divided panel of
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court and held that the
district court had subject-matter jurisdiction because "the FDIA completely
preempts [Vaden's] state-court usury [counterclaims] against a state-
chartered, federally insured bank . ... 19 The dissent concluded that the
preemption doctrine relied on by the majority could not support jurisdiction
because preemption does not override the rule that "[fjederal question
jurisdiction cannot be predicated on federal issues that may arise later in an
action by way of defense or counterclaim."20 The Supreme Court granted
Vaden's petition for certiorari in March 2008.21
III. THE COURT'S HOLDINGS AND REASONING
In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court unanimously held
that a district court may "look through" a § 4 petition to determine whether
or not it has subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition.22 The Court
was, however, divided 5-4 as to whether Vaden's completely preempted
counterclaim could be the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.23 The
majority applied the rule that counterclaims cannot be the basis for
jurisdiction and held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to
entertain Discover's § 4 petition to compel arbitration. 24 The dissent
disagreed, arguing that because the specific dispute that Discover had
petitioned to arbitrate-namely the completely preempted counterclaims-
16 Discover Bank v. Vaden (Vaden 1), 396 F.3d 366, 367 (4th Cir. 2005).
17 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1269.
18 Discover Bank v. Vaden (Vaden I1), 489 F.3d 594, 598 (4th Cir. 2007) (2-1
decision). Vaden also argued that Discover Financial Services was the real party in
interest, not Discover Bank, and that compelling arbitration was improper because (1)
Discover Bank lacked standing and (2) there was not a valid arbitration agreement
between Vaden and Discover Bank. Id.
19 Id. at 608.
20 Id. at 609 (Goodwin J., dissenting).
21 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Vaden v. Discover Bank, 128 S. Ct. 1651 (2008).
22 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1273.
23 See id. at 1279.
2 4 Id. at 1276.
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would be properly before the district court if considered independently, and
the district court should thus have jurisdiction to compel arbitration. 25
A. Courts May "Look Through " § 4 Petitions to Find Jurisdiction
The circuit split underlying the Supreme Court's decision to grant
certiorari concerned whether the federal courts must find jurisdiction on the
face of the petition to compel arbitration or whether district courts can "look
through" the petition and find subject-matter jurisdiction based on the federal
character of the underlying dispute.26 The narrower approach adopted by the
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits required the federal question to be
"evident on the face of the arbitration petition itself' in order for a federal
district court to have jurisdiction.27 Under this approach, federal jurisdiction
could not exist "simply because the underlying controversy between the
parties 'raises a federal question. "28 The broader approach, employed by the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, permits a federal court to "look through" the
petition to assess whether a federal question is present in the underlying
dispute. 29
The Court adopted the "look through" approach used in the Fourth
Circuit and held that "[a] federal court may 'look though' a § 4 petition to
determine whether it is predicated on an action that 'arises under' federal
law."' 30 In analyzing the text of § 4, the Court found that the phrase "save for
such agreement" is most naturally read to mean the underlying conflict
between the parties.31 Therefore, the Court determined that § 4 instructs
district courts to assume the absence of an arbitration agreement and
"determine whether [they] 'would have jurisdiction under title 28' without
it."32
25 Id. at 1279 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26 Id. at 1270 (majority opinion).
27 Vaden 1, 396 F.3d at 368. See Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d
263, 267-69 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 463 F.3d 655, 659
(7th Cir. 2006) (in determining jurisdiction over a § 4 petition, the court may not "look
through" the petition and focus on the underlying dispute); Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver,
108 F.3d 92, 94 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d
981, 986-89 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).
28 Vaden 1, 396 F.3d at 369.
29 Id.; see Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597, 605-06 (court may "look
through" the petition), vacated, reh "g en banc granted, 508 F.3d 576 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
30 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1273.
31 Id.
32 Id. (quoting Vaden 1, 396 F.3d at 372).
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The Court was not persuaded by the "ouster" interpretation of the phrase
"save for such agreement" promoted by Vaden and the circuits adopting the
narrower approach to § 4 jurisdiction. Vaden argued that the "save for"
clause was "designed to ensure that courts would no longer consider
themselves ousted of jurisdiction and would therefore specifically enforce
arbitration agreements. '33 The Court reasoned that this explanation was
textually implausible because § 2 of the FAA directly addressed the problem
of ouster and further that such a narrow approach "would not accommodate a
§ 4 petitioner who could file a federal-question suit in (or remove such a suit
to) federal court, but who has not done so.". 34
B. Federal Jurisdiction Cannot be Invoked on the Basis of a Defense
or Counterclaim
The second question before the Court was "whether a 'completely
preempted' state-law counterclaim in an underlying state-court dispute can
supply subject matter jurisdiction."35 The majority opinion, written by Justice
Ginsburg and joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, held
that because "federal-court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of a
defense or counterclaim, the whole 'controversy between the parties' [did]
not qualify for federal-court adjudication." 36 The majority found that § 4
requires courts to determine "whether the whole controversy between the
parties-not just a piece broken off from that controversy-is one over
which the federal courts would have jurisdiction. '37 Finding that the whole
controversy between the parties concerned Vaden's alleged debt to
Discover-a completely state law cause of action-the Court dismissed
Discover's § 4 petition for lack of jurisdiction. 38
The split between the Court turned on the interpretation of the phrase
"controversy between the parties" as used in § 4.39 The majority held that the
relevant controversy is the "whole controversy between the parties," while
the dissent interpreted "the controversy between the parties" to refer to the
controversy that the petitioner seeks to arbitrate.40 The dissent reasoned that
33 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1274; see, e.g., Westmoreland, 100 F.3d at 267-68.
34 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1275 (emphasis in original).
35 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Vaden v. Discover Bank, 128 S. Ct. 1651
(2008) (No. 07-773), 2007 WL 4350779 (emphasis in original).
36 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1268.
37 1d. at 1276.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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because a district court could have jurisdiction over the dispute Discover
sought to arbitrate if it were brought independently in federal court, the
district court should have jurisdiction to hear the petition to compel
arbitration over the dispute.41 The majority, however, rejected this approach,
stating that it would be inconsistent with the federal rules of pleading to
allow jurisdiction to rest on a hypothesis of how "one might imagine a
federal-question suit involving the parties' disagreement" could have been
styled to present a federal question.42
It is a fundamental rule of pleading that to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a plaintiff must present a well-pleaded
complaint that demonstrates how the action "arises under" the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.43 The majority concluded that
Discover's § 4 petition did not satisfy the "arising under" requirements of a
well-pleaded complaint because federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on
an actual or anticipated defense or counterclaim. 44 In Holmes Group v.
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,45 the Court unanimously held that "a
federal counterclaim, even when compulsory, does not establish 'arising
under' jurisdiction."46
The Court concluded that the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the holding in
Holmes Group when it held that the complete preemption doctrine overrides
the well-pleaded complaint rule.47 Even if Vaden's state law counterclaims
were completely preempted, "under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a
completely preempted counterclaim remains a counterclaim and thus does
not provide a key capable of opening a federal court's door."48 In sum, the
rule adopted by the majority requires § 4 petitioners to establish that a district
court has jurisdiction over the controversy as a whole using the same criteria
that would be applied in standard federal pleading practice. 49 Accordingly,
because the controversy as a whole between Discover and Vaden was based
on state-law and the federal court's jurisdiction could not be based on a
counterclaim, the Court dismissed Vaden's § 4 petition to compel arbitration
for lack of jurisdiction.50
41 Id. at 1281 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1276 (majority opinion).
43 Id. at 1272 n.9.
44 Id. at 1272.
45 Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002),
46 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1272.
4 7 Id. at 1276.
4 8 Id.
49 Id. at 1276.
50 Id. at 1279.
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C. Section 2 of the FAA Requires State Courts to Enforce Arbitration
Agreements
In addition to clarifying the requirements for jurisdiction to bring a § 4
petition in federal court, the Court confirmed that § 2 of the FAA requires
state courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate. Section 2 provides that
arbitration agreements in contracts "involving commerce" are "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable." 51 The Court advised Discover, and similarly-
situated litigants, that because of § 2, federal court intervention is not
necessary to enforce an arbitration agreement.52 Parties may seek recourse by
petitioning a state court to enforce the arbitration agreement pursuant to § 2
or a state statutory remedy similar to § 4.53
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Vaden v. Discover Bank decision may impact how parties who
anticipate enforcing an arbitration agreement during the course of
proceedings will style their complaints as well as the forum available to
parties to enforce arbitration agreements. 54 The "look through" approach
adopted by the Court expands access to the federal courts for litigants in
circuits that previously only found federal jurisdiction when it was evident on
the face of the § 4 petition. 55 The Court's second holding, that federal
jurisdiction must be present in the controversy as a whole, will likely exclude
some parties, such as credit card companies, that relied on the federal courts
to enforce their arbitration agreements when a federal question appeared
during proceedings in state court.56
What remains to be seen is whether the state courts that will now be
receiving petitions to compel arbitration, similar to the one filed in federal
court in this case, will be as diligent about enforcing arbitration agreements
as the federal courts. During oral argument, Discover conceded that it could
have petitioned the state court to enforce the arbitration agreement, but was
concerned that it would not have its "[f]ederal rights protected as zealously
51 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1271, 1278.
52 Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1278.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 1272-73.
55 Id. at 1275. The narrow approach would only "permit a federal court to entertain a
§ 4 petition when a federal-question suit is already before the court, when the parties
satisfy the requirements for diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, or when the dispute over
arbitrability involves a maritime contract." Id.
56 Id. at 1277-78.
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as [it] would in a Federal court."'57 If the state courts are not diligent in
enforcing the rights granted under § 2 of the FAA, the Supreme Courtmay
see another case in a few years clarifying the responsibilities of state courts
to enforce arbitration agreements. 58
Holly E. Walsh
57 Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Vaden v. Discover Bank, 128 S. Ct. 1651
(2008) (No. 07-773), 2008 WL 4527978.
58 Id. (Justice Stevens suggested that if Discover had difficulty having its arbitration
agreement enforced in state court it could petition the Supreme Court).
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